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Chapter Six
RELIGIOUS BROTHERHOODS IN CHECHNYA

Issues of the Post·Communist Transition: Structure. Culture, and Justice
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The Chechens

Religious Brotherhoods in Chechnya
Yavus Akhmadov, Stephen R. Bowers, and Marion T. Doss, Jr.
Executive Summary
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In the introduction to her study "Who Are the Chechen?", Johanna Nichols
explains that the term "Chechen" is a Russian ethnonym, based on the name of a village,
Chechen-aul, rather than the name used by these people to describe themselves. Rather
than "Chechen", they call themselves either as "Nokhchi" or, more frequently in recent
years, as "Vainah," a term best translated as "my nation, my people." Like their
neighbors, the Ingush were also given their name by the Russians. They were named after
the village of Angusht. The Ingush refer to themselves as the Ghalghay, They took this
name from an association of three major families which shared the common surname
Ghalghay. The Chechens are the largest North Caucasian group and the second largest
Caucasian group after the Georgians. Although most Chechens are literate in Russian, at
least 97% of them claim Chechen as their first language. 182
The Chechen people have occupied their north Caucasian homeland for several
millennia prior to the Russian conquest. Their society was characterized by no social or
class distinctions and the only meaningful categories of rank were based on age, kinship
and social honor. And although they had no formal governmental structures, they were
nonetheless an independent nation with their own language and territory.
Since the Russian conquest, the Chechens have suffered deportations, the
suppression of linguistic and religious structures, and the attempt to destroy their culture
through programs of Russification and Sovietization. The Russian-Chechen relationship
has been characterized by periodic explosions of nationalism, violent military clashes,
brutal suppression, and economic desolation.

Major Russian-Chechen Wars
Por over six millennia, Chechens have lived in and defended their North
Caucasian homeland against the inroads of successive invaders, including Persians,
Arabs, Mongols, Buddhists, Turks and Russians. Converted to Islam at about the same
time as the Russian conquest (from the late 1500s to mid- I 800s), the Chechens have
waged successive wars against the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian
Republic, first to avoid conquest and then to achieve independence. The following table
illustrates the relentless nature of this ongoing, intermittent warfare.
Synopsis of the Russian-Chechen conflicts
Sufi Order
Involved

Period

Chechen Leader(s)

Late 1700s

Sheik Mansur Ushurma

Nagshband

1824·1859

Series of Imams, best
known is Sheik Imam
Shamil
Various followers of
the Chechen Ghandi,
Qadiri Sheik Kunta

Nagshband

1864·1865,
1877,1879,
1890s

Qadiri along
with
Nagshband

Result
Russians defeated in 1785
battle of Sunzha River
Short·lived Islamic slate

Conlested Russian rule
through WWI

1"' Johanna Nichols, "Who are the Chechen?", Linguist List,
http://www.hurtfordhwp.com/archives/63/077.htm. pp. 1-2. Nichols, pp. 3-5.
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112
1917-1925

Hadji Kishiev
Sheik Uwn Hadji, et al
Sheik Ali Mitaev

Naqshband
Qadiri

1929-1936

1940, 1943

Hassan lzrailov

1990

President Jhokhar
Dudaev
President Jhokhar
Dudaev
President AsIan
Maskhadov
Shamil Basacv

1994-1996
1999-2000

QuasiQadirist
QuasiQadirist
?
Vakhab

Uprising suppressed in
1925
Soviet purge of sun adepts
continues until eve of
WWII
Entire nation deported to
Siberia in 194, returned to
Chechnya in 1957. New
sun brotherhood Vis Hadji
or Vakhab formed during
exile
Struggle for independence
1992-1994, mobilization
War with Russia and de
facto independence
Current war begun by
Vakhab Islamic
conservatives also known
as Chechcn Figbters

What Is Sufism and Why Is It Important'?

In their book Mvstics and Commissars: Std1sm in the Soviet Union, Alexandre
Bennigsen and S. End;rs Wimbush argue that .Sufis~ is an in~portant aspect of Islam
throughout the world and is becoming increasmgly lln~ortant ~n what ~as the USSR
when they wrote their book. In that study, they provIde an I~troductlon to SufIsm,
analyze the structure of Sufi brotherhoods, de~cnbe .the recrUItment .of. adepts, and
examine the make-up of the brotherhoods and the mner.hfe of ~hose as~oclatlOns.
More recent studies have indicated that the revIval of mterest m Chechen culture
has been accompanied by a conversion to the Sunni branch of Islam. ~ost adh~re .to the
Sufi form of Islam and join together in brotherhoods of 10 t~ 40 dl~clple.s (or dIscIples).
They believe that practitioners of the faith ~an. achie.ve a mystIcal Ul110n wIth God through
the zikr, a ceremony that consists of a recItatIon of prayers tha.t may be accompan~~d by
vigorous dancing that will induce an ecstatic state. I~lam dId. not. replace tradItIOnal
Chechen culture but became a part of it, thus preservmg the IdentIty of the Chechen
nation. 183
Sufism is significant because it is a popular rallying point an~, to the external
world it is not obvious who is or is not a member of these c1andestme brotherhoods.
Sufis~ gives its adherents an organizational basis that is somewhat like that .of th~ early
communist party during its revolutionary stage of development. SufIsm IS the
predominant form of Islam in Chechnya.
. .
.
During the Soviet era, authorities worked to control the formal relIgiOUS structllles
seen as necessary for the practice and persistence of Islam. Consequ~ntly, there was an
"official Islam," supported by the state but maintained at a clearly madequate ~evel. of
.t Whl'le Soviet officials believed that this condition would lead to a detenoratlOn
,
SUppOl .
.'
"I I I I "
of Islamic religious life, the real impact was the nurturIng ot a system of paral e s am

totally beyond the reach of state control. This parallel system supported the de facto
expansion of Islam during a time of anti-Islamic policy.184

Kunta Hadji
.. .There are twenty-seve~l religious movements operating in Chechnya today. Kunta
HadJI IS one of the most nnportant of these and is associated with the Qadiriya
brotherhood, generally regarded as the second most important of the Soviet-era
brotherhoods. As Professor Yavus Z. Akhmadov explains, the Kunta Hadji movement is
the most significant form of Sufism in Chechnya.
Soviet and Czarist efforts to suppress this movement were intense. One
consequence ?f th~ suppression of the Kunta Hadji movement is that no official portraits
of Kunta HadJI eXIst. Professor Akhmadov recounts a meeting that he had in Elishan-Jurt,
the village.it~ which Kunta H~~ji was born. The localmurid said that during his prayers,
he had a VISIOn of Kunta HadJ!. Later, someone showed him a picture and, based on the
vision from his prayers, he declared that it was the founder of this movement. Efforts to
find an artistic conception of what Kunta Hadji looked like have been very difficult. It is
apparent that no such photograph or portrait can be found anywhere in Chechnya or the
surrounding region. Based on what initially appeared to be a promising lead, our contacts
conducted a search in Uzbekistan but, to date, have failed to locate the Sufi saint's
picture.

The Kunta-Hadji Chechen Religious Movement
In Chechnya's long history of national-liberation movements and wars, an
important role was played by events connected with the name of the Sheik Kunta-Hadji.
His name and the movement linked to it acquired special relevance in the 1990's, when a
new attempt to politicize this religious brotherhood took place. For many people, KuntaHadji became the "Chechen Gandhi."
No fearsome Chechen warrior such as Mansur, Ghazi-Mohammed, ShamiI, or
even the legendary brave men Baibullat Taimiev, Bdysangur Benoyevski, et cetera has
been able to exercise such powerful influence on the spiritual life of the Chechen people
as this modest peasant-worker, "miska" (man of God not of this world). The name of the
Sheik is so holy that people considered it a "taboo." In Chechnya, people call him "The
Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurt", "Son of Kisha", or simply "Hadji". He is considered to have
reached a "hidden state of existence" and the details surrounding his death are not
believed.
Throughout its existence, the atheist Soviet regime conducted a fierce ideological
war against the "Son of Kisha" and his followers. Despite great effort, the Soviets lost
this war; the name of the Sheik is still being worshipped by the people of Chechnya, and
the number of his followers has grown up to this day. Currently, the number of active
murids l85 (adepts) in the Islamic brotherhood (Order) of the "Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurt",
who actively practice the dictates of the Order amounts to some 20 to 25 thousand in
Chechnya. However, the total number of those who accept the Order (i.e. recognize the
Bennigsen and Wimhush, pp. 85-86.
Muridism the most militant movcment in Islam. Murids were obligcd to Follow blindly the orders of
sheIkhs and imams. The extreme expression of muridism is the idea of "oazavat" - the war against
"nonbelievers."
0
IH4

IRS

18)

Edward Kline, "Chechnya After the War," ASF New DOCllmellts, http://www.wdn.com/asf/cgi/ASF.

October, 1998, accessed on May 1,2000.
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Sheik as their ustaz,186 although without performing active duties) numbers several
hundred thousand followers.
Consequently, the Order of the Son of Kisha is the largest, most influential, and,
most importantly, the most dynamic, fastest growing organization in the contemporary
Chechen Republic. This allows us to conclude that the phenomenon of the famous mid19th century Chechen Sheik has not yet been exhausted.
The "Hadji movement," in both its political and religious contexts, essentially has
not been studied. While writing this article, I used facts published by representatives of
the Czarist administration-A. Ippolitov and G. A. Vertepov, and carefully reviewed
works of authors of the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, such as H. D. Oshayev, A. A.
Salamov, A. D. Yandarov, V. H. Akayev, and M. M. Moustafinov. It is important to note
the role of the latter author, whose doctoral dissertation on the Order of Kunta-Hadji and
its followers has been particularly helpful. The monographic work on Kunta-Hadji has
been compiled by V.H. Akayev.
From sources related to the above-mentioned movement, we could name
documents found in various archives in Caucasian cities, particularly Grozny,
Vladikavkaz, Tbilisi, Makhachkala, as well as publications of preachings of the "Son of
Kisha" undertaken before the Soviet revolution in the Daghestani town of TemirkhakShura. I have personally gathered a small field material-local stories, legends, including
video and audio recordings.
There are also materials on the topic by several American and British
researchers-G. C. Lemercier-Quelquege, A. Benningsen, G. E. von Grunebaum, and G.
C. Trimmingham, all of whom have written on various Sufi movements in the Caucasus
and the USSR.
It is necessary to caveat this research with the following important explanation.
The author finds it impossible to characterize here the entire complicated world of Sufi
teachings, the intricacies of various currents and theological interpretations, or to explain
the phenomenon of "Sheikdoms" in Chechnya. For that purpose, a different author should
be sought, and most likely such material would be geared towards a different audience. I
would dare to generalize by saying that nearly all contemporary researchers are educated
in the spirit of rationalistic knowledge; the religious cognition has its own world, its own
values, its own universe. In order to understand it, one needs to accept the dogma of
miracles, admit that the laws of nature are subject to change. We limit our goals to
describing the course of events from the outside perspective of this movement, and not
from the inside.
Therefore, according to our data, Kunta was born by the end of the first third of
the 19th century,187 in the family of a Chechen named Kisha from the village Melchi-Khi
(Istee-Sou). Kisha's family belonged to the clan of Gukhoy, one of the 120 Chechen
clans. This comparably small family drew its roots from the Andic society of Daghestan,
as well as from the eastern part of Chechnya and Ichkeria. According to data from
informative sources, when the then future Sheik turned 7, his parents moved to a
relatively small village of Eliskhan-Yurt on the river Michik, which subsequently gave
name to the entire Chechen society (Michigonic).
The story goes that even prior to the birth of the future saint, various unusual
phenomena took place, which were keenly observed by his mother Khedi. And indeed,
186
187

"Ustaz" - religious teacher
By the time he was captured in 1864, Kunta-Hadji was 35-40 years old.
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si.nce ~~rly ch~ldhood the, bo~ attracted ~ttent!~n due to his extraordinary natural wisdom,
11ls ability to lead people s mmds, and hiS ability to see into the future. At the same time
he .wa~ unable to receive a rigorous religious education, although there are source~
i.ndlcatmg .that he c?uld recite the ~ntire .Koran by age 12. Establishing a family, the
future ~helk was p~'lmanly engaged III agncultural work and raising bees. His wife was,
accordmg to certall1 sources, the daughter of a famous Chechen warlord-Baibullat
Taimiev ("the terror of Caucasus" in the words of the renowned RussiaIl
t
·
.
..
poe
A.S.Pus I1k m, who apparently was acqualllted With hun), who reportedly died in the earl
1830's. Thi~ fact sl~ggest~ th~ ~mportance of the "Son of Kisha" in the society, despite hi~
povert~. HIS phYSical dlsablhty, along with his keen mind, deep religious zeal, and
except~onal ~Ift of prophecy drew him to the teachings of Sufism, which had already
been circulatlllg throughout the North Caucasus for some centuries. It is known he first
learned of Sufism sometime during the fourth decade of the 19th century from a fam
'b d Sh 'k
.,
ous
Na I11 . f~8 . el Tashu-I-IadJI of the N.aqshband religious current. Tashu-I-Iadji, just like
Shamll }lIInself: had been. an ~,pprentlce of Mohammed Yara, a popular preacher of the
so-ca.lled Caucastan Mundlsm, whtch demanded of its followers to approach God not
only III prayer, but also on the battlefield as warriors against the "non-faithful". It is quite
probable that Kunta had met other Naqshband Sheiks from Chechnya such as Umal ta
Hadji and Ghezn-Hadji, especially in the period of the Caucasus warI89.'
In the .meantime, the ~all!gasus war, w!lich ~ad begun yet in 1817, was close to an
was showlllg signs of weakness, after 25 years f
end. The Imamate of Shamtl
resistance against Russia, a great world power at the time. 191 This weakness had to do n~t
only with external cir~umstances. The problem also stemmed from the fact that the
Imamate govern~nent Its.elf. h.ad become a burden for the mountaineers, who were
unac~ustom~d Wlt~ the dlsclphne of law; permanent military incursions, high taxes, and
ever II1creaslllg dulles had exhausted the population. Despair and opposition were starting
to gain momentum in the Imamate.
Under the~e extreme.c!rcumstances, the "Son of Kisha," approaching the age of
30, spoke out against the pohcles conducted by Shamil, calling on his followers to refrain
from getting involved in wO.rldly issues and focus solely on prayer while seeking the
mercy ~f God. ~e also predicted the fall of the Imamate and the imprisonment of the
Imam hnnse!f. HIS sta~ements, ~acked by the young preacher's increasing authority, were
warmly received by thiS mountall1ous nation racked with fatigue and hopelessness.
. .. Imam Sha~il, a p~rson ~f great patience and scrupulous fairness, responded by
II1Vltll1g .the asc~tIc. to .hls ca~lt~1 Ved.eno several times, where ~e was given the
~PPOltUI1lt~ to "dlsp~lte hts convl.ctlons with the . Imam's theologians. 19 " Legends say the
~on of Klsha easl.l~ baffled !l1S opponents With the depth of his queries. Finally, by
edrly 1859, at Shamll s suggestIOn, the refractory Chechen departed on his pilgrimage to

18, Imam Shamil (1797-1871) - religious and secular leader of imamate; considered to be a legendary hero

?i9 the Chechens and some other ethnic groups in the Caucasus.
9

The Caucasus War (1817-1864) resulted in the conquest of Caucasus by Russia.

Imamate -theocratic in its ideology and feudal in its political and social structure, this state existed in
the North-Eastern Call~asus. Shamil created an Imamate in the territory of Chechnya and Daghestan in the
!9~40s for struggle agal11st Russia. Disintegrated in 1859.
19' More detail in the journal "Vainakh Scgodnya," N-2(4) 1997.
- Sham~l didn't support Kunta-Khadji because he wanted 10 preserve muridism; he disliked the popularit
of Kunta s followers and their calls for asceticism and equality.
y
I I)
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Mecca (hadji).193 On August 26, 1859, surrounded by the Russian army on the GunibDag Mountain, Shamil capitulated and was sent as war prisoner to Russia l94 .
One of the fundamental characteristics of the "Hadji" fraternity, which sets it apart
from the other Sufi brotherhoods of the Northern Caucasus, is the so-called "quick" or
"loud" zikr195 and a peculiar ritualistic dance. This raises the question as to when and
where did "Hadji" become acquainted with such details of the Qadirian current of Sufism,
namely the "loud" zikr (scream of prayer, or typical Islamic call to prayer by a loud crier
(muezzin) located atop the minaret - the tower of the Mosque). Was it prior to his
pilgrimage to Mecca, or during the travels? Not even the murids can agree on this issue.
One way or the other, during his three-year journey throughout the Ottoman
Empire, the "Son of Kisha" had the opportunity to encounter various Sufi currents and
interpretations, but it is clear that he had chosen to concentrate of the Qadirian one. l% It
is true that the pre-Revolutionary author G.A. Vertepov believed the father of the
Chechen eikhrism was a follower of the Roufai'a movement (named after its founder
Sayed Ahmed Roufai'a), which used fire in its worship, inflicting wounds using cold
weapons, and so forth. However, the practice of eikhrism in Chechnya does not confirm
the presence of such extremes.
The "Son of Kisha" had been in the Ottoman Empire between the years 1859 and
1861, yet his correspondence was arriving in Chechnya even before 1861. In his epistles,
he preached prayer "zikr-ullah," love for one's neighbor, the need for earning one's bread
with one's own work, helping the poor and the orphans, the importance of abstaining
from alcohol and tobacco, forgiving one's enemies, including those who had committed
mortal offenses, and so forth.
Upon his return from Mecca in 1861, his rating and popularity rose considerably
among the Chechen people. He was now a "Hadji", a preacher, a prophet, whose
prophecies concerning the fate of the Imamate and Shamil had fully come true. At that
time, numerous adepts soon surrounded him, forming a religious community with a rather
strong internal organization. Soon thereafter, the "Son of Kisha" became a "Sheik", which
in Chechen terms implies holiness. He was recognized as a man, to whom the future and
the mysteries of the Universe had been revealed, and as a symbol of that, he observed the
"khalvat"-a voluntary time of fasting and prayer which could last for many dayswhich he spent in a deep underground cave (still preserved by his worshipers in the
village of Eliskhan-Yurt).
The brotherhood was headed by the "holy teacher" himself, who was also known
as "the leading Imam". Two most trustworthy disciples, Salman and Machik, were given
the right to conduct religious services, the so-called preaching of the Qadiri tarikat; they
were also named as Sheiks. For the ongoing administration of the fraternal Order, nahibs,
vekhils, turkhs, and tamads (supervisors) were named from among the most prominent
disciples.
The "Son of Kisha" and his representatives were demanding that ordinary murids
follow the holy rituals of the zikr, strictly abide by the Shari'a (Islamic Law), dedicate
themselves to serving God alone, and not participate in worldly affairs. The movement

quickly spread throughout the entire Chechen territory and even into nei(Yhborin
Ingushe~ia, the s?un.d of ~i~r was heard in evelY corner of the country. At the sa~e tim;'
along wlth the flse ~n rellglO.us consci~nce based on the Order of "Hadji," a strong antigovernmental conspIracy aga1l1st Impenal Russia emerged in Chechnya.
I~l order to gain a ~eep und~rsta~ding of the causes that fueled this conspiracy, we
need qUIckly to charactenze the SituatIon created after Russia defeated the Imamate in
Chechnya.

This opinion is not support by the documents.
More detailed in the journal "Vainakh Segodnya," no. 2(4), 1997.
195 This custom was prohibited in imamate.
196 Abd ai-Qadir al-Gilani (1077-1166), who lived in Iraq, is the founder of this school of thought. In the
middle of the 12th century he was well known in Baghdad and the Islamic world.
193

194
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'The country had. be.en comp~ete~y ra:aged by the long-lasting war; the population
Chechnya at the beg1l1111ng of thIS hIstOrIcal period was close to 200,000 inhabitants
an.d. after o~ly 25 ye.ars, in the .186~'s, it numbered about 130,000. Losses from direc~
111llltary actIOns,
famll1e, and epIdemICS amounted to at least 150-200 thousand VI'Ct'Ims.
.
TIle massive and complicated irrigation system of the Chechen plateau had been
destroyed. The strong opponent had captured all forests and half of the arable land.
. The unbearable econom~c, physical and moral climate of constant pressure
~xpenenced by the Chechen natIOn demanded resolution. The military catastrophe and
fall. of the Imamate represented ?nly a short pause in the ongoing saga of the warrior
nation. Already, by May 1860, 111 Eastern Chechnya (Ikcheria) and in the heights of
Argun, a new arme~ peasant revolt had burst out under the leadership of former nahibs,
supporters of Shamll. By late January 1860, Czarist generals destroyed 15 auls (villa )
. II I .
. .
ges
l97 . Nahib Bysangur Benoyevski
111 (C lena to suppress the rebellion 111 Eastern Chechnya
had been captured, and hanged upon conviction by a military-field trial.
During the summer o~ 1861, the entire Argun okrug (region) had been captured by
:he rebels und~r the leadershIp of Ouma Douev and Ata'i Ataev. By the fall of 1861, 15
ll1fantry battalions, 700. ~oss~cks, 1,900 units of cavalry, 3 artillery divisions had
conduc~ed a re:enge miSSIon 111 the mountains of Chechnya. In December 1861, the
Argun ll1SUlTectlOn had been crushed, and the leaders captured and exiled to Russia.
. Having been defeated in open. insur:e~tions, the patriotic forces of Chechnya
deCIded to take advantage of the grow1l1g religIOUS movement of the Son of Kisha and
car~y out an nationali~t uprising .with ~he aim of overthrowing the foreign, authorit~rian
regIme of the conquenng power, nnpenal Russia.
n is important to mention that we are operating here with the notion of the
"Kl~nta-H~ldji m?vem~~t". ~ith a certain degree of understanding. The Sheik personally
del:l~d be1l1g a tItular sptrltual leader" or Imam and, moreover, had ceased his personal
actIvity as a preacher, communicating with his people through mediators. He used to
characterize hi~nself
"tl:e Messiah sent unto the world by the Imam (Makhdi)" to
prep~r~ the believers ~o.r his. return. In the meantime, the movement had been gradually
acqumng a more political focu~ a~d had attracted numerous supporters from among
vet~rans of the late Imam. Shamll" 111 essence all who were unhappy about the current
pollt.y .. By .1863 an espeCially secret leadership had developed to challenge the czarist
admll11Stratlon. There were lesser leaders, nahibs, higher murids, essentially an entire
hierarchy of power had been established.
.

111

,:s

197 General.Ennolov, supr~me commander in the Caucasus region in 1817-1827, developed a plan for the
conquest 01 Caucasus, whIch wa~ to be Implemented first in Chechnya; it included Ihe construction of
fortresses, destructIOn of rebel villages and elimination of their inhabitants. After Ermolov was r II d'
1827, the policy of 'elimination' continued. More detailed in the journal "Vainakh Segodnya~;' ~~~2(;-~~
1998: Avtorkhanov A. "Caucasus, the war of Caucasus, and Shamil."
'
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Imperial forces, which by that time had already acquired significant experience
fighting the liberation movements of Caucasian nations, were able to introduce their
agents and informants within the zikrist movement. Having known of the upcoming
conspiracy, the Czarist ranks were opposing the more orthodox mullahs and Chechen
clergy, giving bribes to influential persons in Chechen villages, and there was even a split
among the masses based on theological divergences.
On the other hand, the Czarist authorities stationed their troops in the key
locations of the Chechen plain and mountains, and strengthened their garrisons. Without
warning, on January 3, 1864, in the Shalin portion of the Argun region, the Russians
captured the "Son of Kisha" and his brother Movsar. In no time, a special convoy
transported the captives across the mountain first to Vladikavkaz, and then to the city of
Novocherkassk. Suspecting that their "spiritual leader" was under arrest in the fortress of
Shali, several thousands of fanatically oriented murids gathered there, led by Salam and
Machik, the closest supporters of the Saint from Eliskhan-Yurt. Holding a black flag, the
famous Chechen cavalier Vara was also in attendance.
By the second half of the month of January, the murids gathered there had already
sent three delegations to the prince Tumanov, commander of the Czarist regiment in the
Shalin fortress, demanding the release of the "Son of Kisha," and were thrice denied.
Then a frantic ZIKR started; believing in Allah's intervention anel the divine powers of
their missing spiritual leader, the immense crowd of about 3,000, including women,
dropped their guns and pistols, approaching the soldiers with revenge and determination.
The Russians responded with fire, and murids were forced to pick up their daggers and
swords, and engage in a furious attack against the Czarist soldiers.
Under heavy artillery fire, the murids could not resist, and were crushed quickly,
over 200 were killed, and several times more were wounded. This battle of January 18,
1864 remained in the memory of the Chechen people as "Sha'altan Tom" - "the dagger
fight of Shali.,,198
After this bloody battle, 18 of the key leaders of the murids were captured as
prisoners, and sent to hard labor camps with sentences from 5 to 8 years. Tens of active
murids were exiled. Zikr and other ritual customs were outlawed under the penalty of
exile, in the mosques in all villages anti-zikrist preaching was read.
However, the person mostly responsible for these events, who became a victim of
the nationwide anti-governmental conspiracy, the person who has always preached
abstinence from worldly affairs and who opposed violence as means to fight evil,
preacher and ascetic, was exiled for life in the city of Ustyuzhko in the Novgorod
gubernia (province). He passed away there on May 19, 1867, and there is evidence
indicating the Sheik died of complete exhaustion caused by famine.
In fact, zikrist believers consider that the Sheik never died, but only passed to a
"hidden", invisible state or "condition". This clearly explains the Messianic mood, which
still persists among the zikrist community.
The Imperial authorities in the Caucasus were hoping that the massive defeat and
execution of murids in the battle of Shali would end this new religious-political
movement. But this turned out to be a self-delusion, the movement went underground,
and the masses continued to revolt from time to time. Thus in May of 1865, a villager
from Kharacha, Taza Ekmirzaev, proclaimed himself as the spiritual follower of the

imprisoned saint, ~nd two more villages joined him in rebellion. Gathering 200-300
supporters ~nd holdmg a green flag, Taza ~k.mirzaev adv.anced at the head of his group to
the mountall1 of ~hetash~KO\t (where traditionally reulllons and national meetings were
held) and proclallned hnnself Imam. In turn, the Czarist commandant immediatel
de~loyed troops for the occupation of the strategic points in Northern Chechnya. Befor~
their approach to the Taza camp, the local village elite, who probably regained their sens
of political self-survival, crushed the movement.
e
Taza was captured, and sentenced to execution, but later the sentence was
replaced by 12 years of hard labor, and subsequent life exile in Sibetia. The Khara h
village was fined, and villagers from Elistandji were even forced to relocate due t~ t~ .~
disobedience.
elt

198 More detailed in the journal "Vainakh Segodnya," no. 1-3(7-9),1998: Said Akhmed Isaev "Massacre in
Shali."
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For se:eral years following the above events, a powerful and energetic wan'ior
Vlra operated II1 ~hechnya. He started as a local warlord, but soon after the battle of Shali
was IU1n:ed Nahl? of the Order. ?f "the Son of Kisha". He attempted to revive the
commul1lty, and hiS efforts and mlhtary feats during the partisan war that followed ear d
f
.
ne
· I'
I11m
t le Image 0 a natIOnal hero. A set of popular songs and ballads about him circulate
throughout Chechnya. However, the death of Vara in a battle against a Czarist
detachment ended all hopes of re-establishing the political importance of the Order.
. C,~nv~nce.d that "the Che~hen t~'ibe" among all nationalities in the Terskaya oblast'
(regIOn) malI1tatn~d the potentl~l spirit of a mass resistance," the Imperial authorities
adopted a system~ttc, planned eXile of the Chechen mountaineers towards the frontier of
the Ot.toman Empire. 01: the other hand, the mountaineers themselves began to emigrate
as a. sign of protest agamst the oppressive regime that deprived them of their freedom.
Dunng th~ summer ?f 1865, 5,000 families, about 23,000 people, left Chechnya. This
was a ul1liu~ n~~slve exodus f:om Rl~ssia by the most energetic, freedom-loving
segment 0 t le. . echen. populatl?l1. Thl.s was clearly an ethnic catastrophe for the
Chechens, depnvlI1g the future nation of ItS best sons. (A similar catastrophe of ev
'bl
.
,
en
more IlOrn e proportIOns, took place in 1944, when the Stalinist regime exiled the entire
Chechen nation to Siberia, condemning it to extinction. An identical catastrophe is taking
place in Chechnya today, in the eyes of the whole world.)
Only due to thei~ ~lI1believable sense of hard work and unique ability to survive
under tl~e. ha~'shest condition has th~ .Chechen nation managed to escape disintegration
and anl1lhllatlon. Mor~over, the traditional economy and customs of the Chechen people
soon .w~re :estored, Villages sprang back to life from ruins, houses, mosques, schools, a
new Irngatlon system arose. Chechnya soon regained its fame as "the granary" of the
Northern Caucasus.
,
. In the 9 decade of the 19 cent~lry,. zikrism started to spread again in Chechnya
dn:1 d~OI~g !ngushets as well, but thiS tnne only as a religious teaching. Certain
ratlonaltstlC I.deas s~arted ~o develop, and the system of organization of religious
brotherhoods In the Villages Improved.
1h

.

1h

H~wever, the single gravitati~nal center in the person of the living sage had

ahead~ disappeared .. ~t the same time, especially during this period, new Sheiks

belonglI1g to the Qadlrtst movement sprang up. Many called themselves "receivers" of
the. Shei~ !rOl~ Eliskhan-Yurta. However, they were applying changes in the rituals,
whl~h dlstll1gUlshed them from the classical Kunta-I-Iadjist movement. Overall such
Sh~lks as Bam.at-Girey, Chin-Mirza, and Batal-Hadji exercised and continue to exe;'cise a
regIOnal and Village-type presence, while the l11uridic brotherhood of the "Son of Kisha"
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embraces the entire country. Later, already in the 1950's, under the Soviet regime, a new
Order developed of the so-called Vis-Hadji - "the white hats." Those consider themselves
followers of Kunta-Hadji, but are denied categorically by his true followers.
lh
It is worth mentioning that by the early 20 century Daghestani printing houses
had published volumes of the aphorisms of the late Chechen saint, collected by his
followers.
For someone to be a follower of the "Son of Kisha" means at this stage to
essentially accept him as "a spiritual father" (teacher)-one's representative before God.
This acceptance implies to carry out a certain number of additional prayers or formulas,
such as the interpreting of the "zikr" in the form of a loud cry with a shrill voice (with a
rhythmical repetition of the fundamental Islamic prayer "la-i1aha-il-Allah" while in an
ecstatic state running around in a circle performing a peculiar "dance"). At the same time,
the murid agrees to embrace a set of rigid moral and ethical rules. The Order worships as
holy places the tomb of his mother Khedi in the village Hadji-aul in the Veden region of
Chechnya, as well as the remains of Sheik's courtyard in the village of Eliskhan-Yurt. We
have to mention that the Order has no unified center, each village brotherhood is led by
an elected Turkh (leader).
Zikrism was first popular among the poorest layers of Chechen society. This is
why zikrists tended to support the Bolshevik banners during the 1918-20 civil war in
Russia, often fighting against the armies of General Denikin. The Soviet power initially
flirted with the Chechen Muslims to gain support, but soon placed believers under
repression. Arrests of zikrist became commonplace, however, as sources point out, the
zikr never ceased, not even in prisons or exile.
After the mass deportation of 1944, the Kunta-Hadji brotherhood gained even
more strength. Its growing popularity could be explained by the great misfortune of the
Chechen people: people often found hope and peace in their systematic prayers to God
and the invocation of their spiritual father, the "Son of Kisha."
Upon the restoration of the Chechen-Ingushet Republic in 1957 and until the
beginning of Perestroika in 1985, the relations between authorities and Kunta-Hadjists
have been largely antagonistic, sometimes shifting to alert-neutrality. The process of
revival of Islamic values has led to the intensification of Kunta-Hadjist communities, the
establishment of a religious hierarchy and growth of the number of those studying
Islamic theology.
In the fall of 1991, a group led by General 1. Dudaev acceded to power l99in
Chechnya. It is said to have represented the radical extreme of the nationalist circles .
Declaring himself as a murid of Kunta-Hadji, Dudaev ensured his new regime a certain
level of political support from the more backward and darker side of this movement. The
symbols of the "new revolution" were zikrist mass prayers on the central streets and
squares of Grozny. However, praying on the dirty city asphalt for true murids was a
disgrace, and so it is clear that these popular "dances" were engineered by a hired
"ensemble" of individuals with no dignity and respect for the true traditions. The KuntaHadjist communities soon overcame the euphoria of "victory", and their attitude towards
Dudaev and the like became more careful. In the years of the first Chechen war (199496), young murids actively protested against the violence of the federal Russian troops,

In the aftermath of the war the entire Ch h
.
danger-Vakhabism. On the edge of this new fi ht ec en s~~lety was struck by a new
whose values were declared heretical by the Vgkh
a awb~re.partlcUlarIy
Its 111 the first the
I Kunta-Hadjists,
I·
.
bloody clashes occurred in villages between
.
p ac~. n a senes of
declared that the Vakhabits should be k· kYodung mUfrIdS and Vakhablts. The zikrists
IC e out a Chechnya a d
.' n
strongly
supported by all other Sufi orders in Chechn a TI· r
the Mufti (leading cleric) of Chechnya, Ahm~d~H ~.~ ;~ was perslste~tly carned out by
a JI a yrov, belongll1g to the Order of
the "Son of Kisha."
T

wer~

In July 1998 in the city of Gudermes massive fi ht
f
gl s arose between the Vakhabits
and their opponents which led to the kl·ll·
. .
'.
mg 0 over 00 Vakhabits H . I
..
maJOl battle,
the
Vakhablts
concentrated
tl
..
f
·
ost thIS
. ..
len orces m the to . f aVll1g
U· M
wn 0
IUS- artan,
transform1l1g It 1I1to their fortress.
The Kunta-Hadjists, on the other hand 0 enl s u ·
.
Shari'a Islamic laws, have severely criticized 're~de~ A pp~rtll1g the rest~ratlOn .of the
stand towards the issue of Vakhabism. For th:r m tt . . . ~askh~dov for hIS ambIguous
le CUlrent
war klmany
Kunta-Hadjists have adopted a neutl.al
a even
el, 111 at c1ea
, p OSI.t.lOn, or
r M
d ordinary
such as . A.H. Khadyrov . Their hope is, th at tlle R
.
,r
an
1- as 1£1 ov stance,
USSIans will O! d I·
b
Vakhablts want to strengthen
their positions in Ch ec hnya f orever. 1e ay eave, ut the
..
.
..
TIle Kunta-HadJlst Order in Chechnya to this da
there are no direct descendants of the Sheik. It is onl y has no ul1lt~d leadership,. smce
Y
ll D
thatd ll1f· Turkey
descendant of the Sheik's daughter , Genel..,
. G yunes h kfnown
orrner he
th . . reSIdes a
d ant' of
. the Sheik'
a 0 . e JOll1t-staff of
the . Turkish armies, and in Russia
,. , dwells a d
escen
I. Suleymenov. There are rumol·s tIl at descen d ants of Sheik' b· stl slster-Generalmajor
.
M
.
1I1 Iraq .. The emergence or a unifying leader could make th
. s 10 ler, ovsar,
power 111 Chechnya. The emergence of a stron I d.
e Older the strongest rulmg
potentially lift that individual to one of ' the g ea I~g 'p~rsonality in the Order could
country.
most slgl11flcant levels of power in the

l~ve

Paradoxically, to become leader of the Kunta-Had··
..
subsequently in a position to seize political power ther JIst Ordel III Cl~echnya, and
someone like General D. Gyupesh, because he is the led: WOldlld be pOSSible only for
Hadji.
'
,
on y Irect escendant of the Kunta2oo

Relevance of Religious Brotherhoods to Current C

fl· t

In 01·d er t0 apprecIate
.
on IC . .
the relevance of the Kunta H d··
to place this brotherhood within the context of other
h a JI I~o:eme~t, It IS necessary
f
suc. aSSOCiatIons III Chechnya. As
noted above the Kunta HadJ·i I·S onl
,
,
y one 0 an estImated t
,,:enty-seven Cheche~
?rotherhoods but, with the Vakhab movement (also know'
IS one of the two largest. A result of this multiplicity of n ;s .the DJama~t m~vement), It
.
re Iglous group1l1gs IS that each
has developed an exclusive sense of
,
commul11ty or c1ann· I
h
to
promote
only
their
immedl·ate
"b
th
"N
IS mess t .
at .encourages
members
d
.
'
ro ers. on-memb
me legar ed as
belllg beyond the moral code that applies onl with.
Consequently, corruption is not only rampant but i~ al .Ill r~~c~ partlcula~ community.
affiliation and dogma.
"
so JUS I Ie on the basts of religious

e~s

and displayed fanatical resistance.
200

199

There arc different opinions among the Chechens about the role of Dudaev in the events of 1991-1995.

Some still consider him a national hero.

None of the descendants of Kunta-Hadji can become the I
mamtained a religious life and their style of living is far f
theader of the movement since none of them has
rom e prinCiples advocated by Kunta.
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One important consequence of this corruption has .been..an ex~cerbati?l~ of
tensions leading to violent clashes involving g.roups I.dentlfled with .religl~:lS
brotherhoods. An example of one such clash occurred 111 1998 Il1 Guder~es, an 1I1dustllal
center which had fallen under the control of organized crime after the fIrSt Chechen. war.
In this case an armed Vahkab group known as Shariat's Guar~ wage? a battle ~gall1st a
criminal gang that was attempting to assert control over local mdustnal enterpns~s. The
criminal gang was under the leadership .of Sulim Yamadaev, o~e of Chechny~.s m~st
prominent underworld figures, and enjoyed t1~e patronage of :,-hmed ..Kadnov, an
important local politician. An estimated twen:y-e!ght people were killed dUl1l1g the battle
and an additional dozen died in subsequent skmTIlshes.
Thus, both corruption and violence have become th.e hallmark .of contemporary.
Chechen life. The deterioration of national life is reflected m changes .111 the patterns of
societal violence since the immediate post-Soviet period. Dunng the first Chechen ~ar,
'onal unity that was reflected in the fact that almost all factiOns
tIlere was a d egree 0 f natl
'
.
.
.
joined in fighting against the Russians. For them, the flghtmg was seen ~s a war of
'national liberation. The more recent post-Soviet years ha:e b~en charactenzed by the
vendettas undertaken by individuals whose families wel:e killed m early clashes that now
appear to have been futile efforts to assert natio.n~l identity.
.'
.
In this environment, it is not surpnsmg that almost all sects have. aimed
formations, generally described as militias, which w~rk to advan~e the. ofte~-dlv~rgent
interests of their particular brotherhoods. A very practical cxplanatlon fO! the appearance
'ormations is that the North Caucasus region is populated by numerous veterans
o f suc h f
,
fl'
. Abkh'
d
rved not only in the Soviet Anny but fought in the con ICtS Il1
• aZIa an
w I10 se
.
'1'
d
.
dh
Afghanistan. These people have li~ited trail~in~ beyo!ld their ml I~ary e .~lcatiOn an av.e
almost no civilian career options 111 the regiOn s ternble econ.O!TIlc envlIonment. Shamll
Basaev, for example, participated in the fighting in Abkhazl~ and Maskhadov served
with Soviet troops that suppressed demonstrations in the BaltiC state~. For such people,
armed conflict provides a natural opportunity for one of the services they can best
provide.
.
. h f .
\ ..
The basis for most active of the armed groupS III Chechnya IS t ~ ol.mer mem JelS,
of the Shariat's Guards, the Shariat's "Courts", and former members ot various o~'gans of
state security. The Shariat's Guards and the Shariat's Courts were orgamzed by
Chechnya's Vakhab movement and were composed of young mel~ who saw themselves
as being at the forefront of the fight against criminality and corruptIon., T~e stated"goal of
the Shariat's Guard was to implement decisions made by .the Shanat s C.ourts .. Th.o.s~
quasi-judicial decisions were intended to ser:e as ex~resslons of the. Shana, ,W!lICh I~ a
specific interpretation of the Koran. The S.hana, th~refore, s~ould be vlewe~ as. law ba~ed
on the Koran. Each sect, of course, has Its own 1l1terpretatlon of th~ ~0r.1l1 m ordel to
advance that sect's specific agenda. The overall goal of the Shanat s ?uard was to
reinstate the "true law", which for the Vakhab movement means full equality for a~1 men
before God and the law. In short, this was intended to be a practical code of behaViOr for
all followers of Islam.
.
'. .
Since 1997, most of the militias' military efforts have been directed agamst othel
sects rather than against state agencies. This situation is, il~ .large part, a result of the
Shariat's Guard view of itself as the true expression of legltnnate state power and th.e
resultant necessity to direct their efforts against other sects that challenged their

legitimacy. In this, they present themselves as being involved in the struggle against
corruption and criminality rather than as agents of religious extremism.
The religious brotherhoods have emerged as major political actors in Chechnya
and they played an important role in facilitating the demise of the Dudaev regime. While
Dudaev utilized religious appeals in advancing his political agenda, it became obvious to
serious Muslims that Dudaev's commitment to the Kunta Hadji movement was, at best,
superficial and, more likely, insincere. This apparent hypocrisy, coupled with complaints
over his increasingly dictatorial operational style and suspicions that he was a "Russian
agent," contributed to his political decline.

Contrast between Kunta Hadji and Vakhab Movements
While the clashes between the various armed formations might be dismissed as
the expressions of narrow self-interest, it is essential to note that there are important
differences between the Kunta Hadji and Vakhab movements as well as other sects
operating in Chechnya.
Much of the contrast between the two main groups is based on theology and
philosophy. There are several important religious differences that set the Kunta Hadji
movement apart from the Vakhab movement. The latter believes in general equality
before the law and argues that all men should be treated equally regardless of nationality,
wealth or language. Like most Muslims, this egalitarianism does not extend to gender
issues. Women have a subordinate place in Chechen society, whether they live in the
Vakhab or the Kunta Hadji communities. The Vakhab brotherhood is far less clannish
than the Kunta Hadji and, for that matter, other sects. The Kunta Hadji, of course, unlike
the egalitarian Vakhab, claim numerous saints.
Again consistent with Vakhab egalitarianism, leadership positions or functions are
not inherited. They are, by contrast with the Kunta Hadji, based on personal merit. This is
closer to traditional Chechen mentality. Their struggle against corruption is justified on
the basis of their view that there should be no favoritism or special arrangements for
anyone. In the Kunta Hadji community, leadership is inherited and closely parallels their
belief in sainthood.
In addition to these religious disputes, there are important distinctions in terms of
their respective views of Russians. The position of the Kunta Hadji, while not identical to
that of the "official" Islamic institutions of the Soviet era, is much more supportive of
Russia. Its essentially pacifist posture creates an environment in which it is possible to
advocate a continued place for Chechnya within the Russian Federation. By contrast, the
Vakhab movement advocates the restoration of "true Islam" and supports a struggle
against domination by the Russians. They are also openly hostile to the region's
traditional Sufi Islam because of its moderation and its incorporation of pre-Muslim
traditions. For the many Russians as welJ as Sufi Muslims who feel threatened by this
tendency, Vakhab is simply another word for "extremist." The Kunta Hadji followers
joined the Russians in denouncing the Vakhab movement as a great threat to Chechnya.
Interestingly, while there is considerable focus on the anti-Russian orientation of the
Vakhab, it is important to remember that the brotherhood maintains an equally critical
view of Western society.
It is also essential to note that there is a fundamental trend that works against
stability in the North Caucasus region. It is something that can be seen not only in
Chechnya but also in Dagestan and central Asia. The main features of this trend are: (I) a
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collapse of state authority, (2) a lack of faith in state officials, (3) economic adversity,
and (4) persistent intervention by Islamic groups from abroad. The violence that came in
1999 to Dagestan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikstan was driven by these factors and
the Chechen situation is subject to the same factors.

Connections with Taliban and Other Outside Groups
Recognition of the fact that such an important and dynamic brotherhood can, like
other Islamic movements for national liberation, pose a challenge to Western society
prompts legitimate questions about their relationship with Islamic organizations outside
the region. While Islam did much to provide spiritual comfort to Chechen soldiers during
the 1994-96 war, it has undergone dramatic changes during the decade since the collapse
of the USSR. Most important, open borders have made it possible for Arab missionaries
espousing a more radical form of Islam to find convelts in the Caucasus region as well as
what was Soviet central Asia. The newly converted Muslims have been increasingly
hostile to Chechnya's traditional Sufi orders and have opened the door to outside groups
with more violent tendencies.
One such organization that has attracted attention because of these developments
is the Taliban movement. While there are important philosophical differences between
Chechen religious brotherhoods and the Taliban there are also some similarities. The
essential fact, however, is that within Chechnya there is little interest in the Taliban or,
for that matter, other such groups located abroad. The primary reason for this disinterest
is the fundamental provincialism of most Chechen movements. They see events and
actors within Chechnya and the Chechen community as of primary importance and all
others of limited relevance to their struggles.
Apparently, the Russians take the Taliban much more seriously. Reportedly,
Russian President Vladimir Putin feels Osama bin Laden and the Taliban have supported
Chechen efforts to gain their independence from the Russian Republic and has even
threatened to bomb Afghanistan if necessary.

Chapter Seven
ISLAM IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS: A PEOPLE DIVIDED

